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Craig Stockings. Britannia’s Shield: Lieutenant-General Sir Edward
Hutton and Late-Victorian Imperial Defence. Port Melbourne, VIC:
Cambridge University Press, 2015. Pp. 348.
Was General Hutton, General Officer Commanding (goc ) of the
Canadian Militia, 1898-1900, a political “Trojan horse” sent to
Canada by British Colonial Secretary Joseph Chamberlain, intent
on dragging the Dominion into imperial military commitments
overseas? Was his mission to work alongside Governor General Lord
Minto to prepare the Canadian Militia so it might serve, on demand,
as part of a British Imperial Army? These are questions that
Australian military historian Craig Stockings examines intensively
in Britannia’s Shield. They are significant for both Canadians and
Australians, whose countries both faced the challenge of developing
a national army under British leadership at the turn of the century.
Stockings explains why earlier historians, governments, public,
and press have often believed a conspiracy existed among British
military and colonial officials who planned to raise a force in the
self-governing dominions to serve as an adjunct to British troops
and help to bolster the Empire’s strength against rising European
threats. After sifting through policy documents, correspondence,
meeting minutes and reports arising from Hutton’s military service
in Australia, Canada, and South Africa, Stockings firmly rejects
the concept of a Chamberlain-Hutton-Minto conspiracy that was
intended to dupe colonial officials into accepting a combined Imperial
military force, including the one that Canada sent overseas during
the South African War of 1899-1902.
The resulting book is a well-researched and balanced examination
of General Hutton’s career. Britannia’s Shield solidly establishes
the context behind Britain’s imperial-colonial military relations in
the years leading up to the First World War. Stockings shows the
emergence of legislation in 1904 to establish a Canadian “national
army” as being largely a result of Hutton’s personal contributions,
rather than a victory over Imperial aims. He regards Hutton’s career
as an instructive reflection of the times, one that sheds light on lateVictorian thinking on the role of land defence forces within the British
Empire and the embryonic structures of imperial military policy in the
dominions. Throughout the book, Stockings represents “imperialism”
as a type of Empire-wide nationalism, rather than a tool of economic,
political, or military control. Hutton, by this view, becomes an
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ideal case study reflecting the philosophies and practicalities of the
debates over imperial defence. Hutton brought unique expertise to his
role as General Officer Commanding the Canadian Militia: he had
previously led the New South Wales colonial forces, was a creator
of the post-Federation Australian Army, and had fought in four
expeditionary British wars. In the South African War, his command
consisted of a mounted infantry brigade that included troops from
Britain, Australia, New Zealand, and Canada. His vision was not one
in which colonial troops were to be subsumed in an imperial force,
but rather that of self-governing dominions building up their own
national militias to come to the aid of the Empire when their own
governments decided upon such action.
In his discussion of the “Trojan-horse” theory among noted
historians of Canadian history, Stockings identifies Carman Miller,
Desmond Morton, and Richard Preston as key proponents (pp. 168,
302). Stockings states that to Miller (The Canadian Career of the
Fourth Earl of Minto),1 Hutton was little more than a “perfidious
agent of Empire” running a simple program of military imperialism.
To Morton (Ministers and Generals),2 Hutton is a villain, an agent
of British policy, and a puppet of Chamberlain sent to Canada for
the purpose of re-establishing British influence in Canadian military
affairs. Further, Stockings examines Preston’s argument that for
Hutton, the militia was never a Canadian organization but a district
of the British military command system (Canada and ‘Imperial
Defense’).3 The result is a valuable and eye-opening treatment of his
place in the history of Canada’s contribution to the Boer War.
Stockings contends that the incident initiating suspicions
of Hutton’s backroom plotting was the premature release of an
announcement on 3 October 1899 in the Canadian Military Gazette
that Canada would send a contingent to the South African War,
even though the Laurier government had not yet passed such a
motion. Prime Minister Wilfrid Laurier and his Cabinet suspected
that Hutton was behind the press release, which they viewed as an
Carman Miller, The Canadian Career of the Fourth Earl of Minto (Waterloo, ON:
Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 1980).
2
Desmond Morton, Ministers and Generals: Politics and the Canadian Militia,
1868-1904 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1970).
3
Richard Preston, Canada and ‘Imperial Defense’: A Study of the Origins of the.
British Commonwealth’s Defense Organization, 1867-1919 (Durham, NC: Duke
University Press, 1967).
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effort to force the government’s hand in contributing to the war. They
knew the published memo outlined a contingent identical to plans for
an infantry unit of 1209 men that Hutton had drawn up at Minto’s
suggestion weeks earlier. Stockings points out: “The coincidence
seemed more than suspicious; it smelled like a conspiracy.” He believes,
however, that even the overconfident Hutton was too intelligent to so
blatantly breach the barrier between political and military authority.
Definitive proof has not been uncovered, and Stockings continues:
“Nonetheless, appearances and passions, at this heated moment in
Canadian political history, well and truly trumped balanced analysis.
Hutton was in trouble” (p. 181).
A series of disputes over the next few months between Hutton
and Minister of Militia Frederick Borden, and ultimately the entire
Laurier Cabinet, led to Hutton’s dismissal as goc . His arrogance
during the crisis, his appeals to the popular press to force Laurier into
an imperial commitment, and constant speech-making on matters
that were seen as the territory of government authorities ultimately
led to Hutton being accused of “every kind of Machiavellian plot”
to draw Canada into the South African War (p. 196). However,
Stockings contends that Hutton’s personal role and influence in
bringing Canada into the war was, in reality, much less than either
he or his subsequent critics would have it (p. 197). Ultimately, it
was the enthusiasm of imperialist support in populous Ontario that
swayed Laurier’s decision. With intricate detail, Stockings shows that
there was no betrayal of Canadian interests and no imperial plotting.
The British War Office had no such plans in place, there was no
overarching unity of thought on imperial defence, and no hidden
masters urging Hutton onward (p. 255).
A major highlight of Britannia’s Shield is found in its wide
array of multinational archival sources. In particular, the Hutton
Papers feature voluminous correspondence with British military and
War Office officials that serve as a revealing lens through which
to investigate imperial defence, alongside Hutton’s personal role
within the evolving movement. Stockings reveals that, in contrast to
correspondence and reports, Hutton’s memoirs were “frustrating” to
work with (p. 7), and perhaps this explains why all endnote references
to “Memoirs” have no date included. An interesting follow-up piece
would more closely identify the date of memoir entries, comparing
Hutton’s actual moments of “up-to-the-neck” trouble making and his
(sometimes) more mature assessment of the events that was written
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years later. Both sources are self-aggrandizing and overestimate his
impact on military effectiveness, none more so than his hindsightinspired claim of 1916 in which he saw his scheme of cooperative
imperial defence “bearing rich and lasting fruit – not only for giving
us victory over our German foe, but by consolidation of the Empire
as its final result” (p. 280).
Certainly, Hutton made significant reforms to the Canadian
and Australian military forces in terms of the creation of national
armies, and to British attitudes toward the benefits of mounted
infantry. Canadian readers of Stockings’ work may find his portrayal
of Hutton’s role to be overstated, in that it largely ignores the role of
Minister of Militia Frederick Borden in bringing about vital reform
of the Canadian Militia. Hutton’s inability to work with others,
particularly politicians, often overshadowed his military brilliance
and ultimately forced the War Office to recall him from three overseas
postings as goc . Blind to the human aspect of his work, particularly
in relation to the politicians who were, indeed, his employers, Hutton’s
boundless energy, speech-making, and newspaper releases began to
work against him. However, as Stockings notes, “His busy pen was
never indicative of personal or imperial scheming” (p. 256). The
result is a well-researched and authoritative account of a key figure
in the history of Canadian and imperial military development at the
turn of the twentieth-century, and an essential contribution to our
understanding of the events that led to a Canadian expeditionary
force being sent to the South African War.
james wood , okanagan college
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